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This paper is a product of a wider inquiry initiated by the National
Bureau of Economic Research in mid-1950, at the request of the
Life Insurance Association of America and with its generous assis-
tance. The inquiry deals with long term trends in capital formation
and financing in the United States - in the hope that establishing
these trends and analyzing the relevant factors may contribute to
a l)etter understanding of current problems and to a more intelli-
gent view of the future. Even if we find, as we well may, that the
patterns of change revealed by the past are too complex and the
factors at play too uncertain in their bearing to permit specific
projections, whatever we learn should sers'e to enrich and revise
current notions and theories, and thus provide a sounder basis
upon which both research and policy may be planned.
The inquiry is organized primarily about the major capital-
using and demanding sectors of the economy - agriculture, min-
ing, manufacturing, public utilities, residential real estate, govern-
ment, and the foreign sector. Each is the subject of a study designed
to analyze the factors that have determined trends in capital forma-
tion and financing in the sector and to indicate, so far as possible,
the significance of these factors for the future. In tracing trends in
real capital formation we try to reach back to 1870; in dealing
with trends in financing, we must, in most cases, stop at 1900 and
have great difficulties extending the record even that far back.
In addition to the sector studies, the inquiry comprises two
others, of somewhat wider scope. One deals with intermediate
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Professor Grebler's paper deals with what,on the scale of the
inquiry, is a brief period and anarrow facet - federal credit aids
in their impact on the volume and financing ofnew nonf arm resi-
dential construction during the pastseventeen years. But within
this area, the conclusions arc striking, andare of genera! interest
not only because the magnitudes of the affectedprocesses are so
massive, but also because they reflectpart of a wider trend with
far-reaching ramifications.
Let me state the main factual conclusions ofProfessor Grebler's
richly documented paper, quoting histext directly whenever con-
venient.
Of the 9.5 million new dwelling unitsconstructed in this
country during the seventeen years, 1935-5 1,some 3.8 million, or
about 40 per cent,were financed with mortgage loans insured by
the Federal Housing Administrationor guaranteed by the Vet-
erans' Administration. For the sixpostwar years, 1946-51, when
5.8 million dwelling unitswere built, 2.6 millions of these, or over
45 per cent, wereso financed.
The federal credit aidprogram was most important in financ-
ing new, medium priced,one-family houses in therange from
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financial institutions, and attempts to establish tiends in external
financing channeled through these various institiitons an(1 tolink
them, so far as possible, with various groups of capital users. The
other general study combines the results of all others and places
them within the broader framework provided by countrywideesti-
mates of national product and their relevant components, and of
country-wide estimates of assets and (IebtS. The whole inquiry
gains much from a study of savings covering the period since 1897,
recently completed by Dr. Raymond W. Goldsmith underthe
auspices of the Life Insurance Association of America.
The monographs which will present our results in detailwill, it
is hoped, be completed within a year or two. For earliercirculation,
we shall present some of the findings as occasional papers, of which
the present is the first.
I$6,000 to $12,000. The proportion ofnew dwelling units financed
by fccicrally insured mortgageswas higher for rental than for
owner-occupied housing, after World War II, but rental unitswere
relatively few iii number.
From 1935 through 1951, the total of insuredor guaranteed
mortgage loans on new construction amounted to $22 billion; $17
billion of it originated during the six postwaryears, 1946 through
195!. Over the entire period, government insuredor guaranteed
loans averaged about 45 per cent of the total estimated flow of
mortgage funds into new construction, and about 50 per cent dur-
ing the six postwar years. At the end of 1950, the estimated balance
outstanding of FHA and VA loans on existing andnew construc-
tion, over $22 billion, was roughly 40 per cent of the aggregate
residential mortgage debt.
"The exclusion of individual lenders in the FHA program
and their small share in the VA program have accentuated the
tendency toward institutionalization of the residential mortgage
debt. The government insurance programs, particularly FHA,
have stimulated the participation of commercial banks in residen-
tial mortgage financing." (p. 36)
Largely through the Federal National Mortgage Association,
a government owned facility, the government assisted in develop-
ing a secondary market for FHA and VA loans, which tended to
widen the geographic scope of the market for mortgage loans. Even
more important, the FNMA became a primary supplier of mort-
gage funds in some of its operations, e.g., through heavy purchases
of VA loans in 1950 and 1951. 'l'his function is quite distinct from
that of attracting private funds through insurance or guarantee.
"The federal credit aids since the middle thirties have prob-
ably accelerated the decline in residential mortgage interest rates
and the liberalization of other contract terms. Lower interest rates
and particularly longer contract terms on FHA and VA loans,
compared to conventional mortgages, represent advantages to bor-
rowers under these programs so far as periodic outlays are con-
cerned. Because of the indirect influence of easy credit on prices
paid for new as well as existing construction during the war and
5I
postwar periods, however, these advantages were at least partially
canceled by price effects." (p. 53)
'I'hc capsule summary ahove does hare justice to the findingsof
Professor Greblcr's paper. It would hardly be pOssil)ie tosuIIIma_
rize here his illuminating comments on the effects ofgovernment
credit aids on the volume of new residential constructjoii;oil its
distribution between rental and owner-occupied housing,or among
various price classes; on the channeling of mortgage funds through
various types of financial intermediaries; or on the realcosts of
financing to the consumers. Nor can one condense his discussion
of the changing philosophy behind this particular group ofgovern_
nient policies --- the shift from thinking largely in terms of "pump
priming" under conditions of underemployment ofresources to
emphasis on facilitating supply, under conditions of full employ-
ment, to groups that, without special aid, would have difficulty in
securing new housing. Finally, it would scarcelyserve a useful pur-
pose to try to summarize Professor Grebler's provocative discussion
of the significance of this record of government credit aid forthe
future - particularly the possible extension ofgovernment activity
beyond mere aid to private financing of new housingto measures
that would stimulate new construction, not necessarily withprivate
financing as this term is ordinarily understood. Thereader, whose
interest the preceding remarks are designed to stir, is urgedto turn
to Professor Grebler's discussion.
The principal purpose of this introduction isto indicate the
relation of the findings in the paper to the mainconcern of the
broader inquiry into capital formation and financing.In one sense
this relation is obvious, for the quantitiesspeak for themselves.
From 1946 through 1950, inone quinquenniuni, nonfarm resi-
dential building amounted to $40 billion,out of a total of private
domestic capital formation (gross) ofover $180 billion, or some-
what less than a quarter. Itmay safely be asserted that the ratio
of external financing togross capital formation is much higher
for nonfarm residential constructionthan for other types of busi-
ness capital formation. It follows that the governmental activities
with which Professor Greblcr deals directlyaffected a quarter of
all private domestic capital accumulation,and a much higher
6proportion of the total external capital funds used for this purpose.
Rather than stress the obvious, it may he ofmore interest to
touch briefly upon a more difficult problem raised by I'rofessor
Grebkr's paper. What does this historical incident, this rapid
change during a period just a bit more thana decade and a half,
mean with respect to our capacity to extract from the past results
both tangible and stable enough to providea firm basis for analyz-
ing current problems and future prospects? This question, which
haunts all research into complex and variable phenomena, isper-
liaps most appropriate here- when we deal with a case of rapid
change, the acting agent being that apparently most unpredictable
institution, the government.
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As Professor Grebler observes, each step taken by the government
in providing aids in financing new residential construction might
be explained by the specific circumstances of the time. If one asks
why each phase of this unprecedented program of insurance and
guarantees was undertaken when it was, one can find many appar-
ent reasons iii the immediate antecedents. The drastic decline in
values and the resulting threat to the whole ownership and debt
structure of the country that occurred after 1929 produced condi-
tions under which an adequate flow of funds tonew construction,
without aid by government, was thought by many to be far from
likely. One should also note that, at least as far as the historical
record back to the Civil \Var reveals, the decade of the 1 930's was
the first since the 1870's in which the drastic contraction of the
long cycle in residential construction and values coincided with
a severe and prolonged depression in general business conditions.
Finally, it occurred when the structure of real estate debt was
more fully encased than ever before in a complex network of inter-
mediate financial institutions acting as custodians of the savings
of a vast majority of the population. Under such conditions, many
thought that the drastic process of deflation could only be checked
by government aid, and that a satisfactory revival would not
otherwise take place. Likewise, the coming of World War II and
the accompanying restriction on construction; the accumulated
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shortage of housing facilities; theexpected pressures upon limited
productive resources in the postwarreconstruction; the restrictive
effects of rent control; and many otherfaccts of thc economic and
political scene provided a setting withoutwhich tile governmental
aid programs might not havebeen undertaken.
It is patent that other specificexplanations could be added to
or substituted for thosementioned. Less apparent is the implica-
tion of this wealth of specifIc explanations.That each step in go'-
ernmental activity in this, as in many other fields, can be traced
to a variety of antecedentssonic immediate and others with
roots in the longer Past - makesall the more difficult reduction
to a few determining factors.We are faced here with the familiar
problem of generalizing from specific interpretations of concrete
historical events. One is always struck by the multiplicity of
"causes" that can be adduced for any specific historical event, or
a specthc chain of them.Were these "causes" reducible to one or
few dominant factors, of the kind that can be observed and empi-
rically studied - not merely glib references to "trends" and "waves
of the future" - the task of deriving a tenable theory for analysis
of current problems or predicting future prospects would be much
simpler. Yet, however ditlicult the task, the first prerequisite is a
clear realization of the difficultya full recognition of the his-
torical setting within which the events occurred, the kind of lecog-
nition that is provided by Professor Grebler's account.
This account of the development of a new pattern of govern-
mental aid also suggests the great capacity of society, particularly
when organized with adequate room for individual and group
initiative, for social invention. The record of the human mind in
the fields of scientific discovery and technical invention has be-
come so familiar that reference to it is a commonplace. Anyone
who has ever observed how society deals with the succession of
problems into which it seems to blunder cannot fail to be impressed
by the ingenuity and inventiveness that goes into evolving new
measures, new institutions, new practices. Professor Grebler's ac-
count is a story of one of these social inventions. But if our economic
and social past has been materially affected by tile series of social
(as vell as technical) inventions, an orderly pattern is bound to
8he all the more elusive. Discoveries and inventions, by definition,
include an clement of the unusual and accidental; would not this
element he sufficiently strong to render the past a succession of
events, each specifically explicable, but not falling easily into
recognizable and simple patterns?
Clearly, a broad inquiry such as the present study of capital
formation and financing must assume some discoverable order in
the past, some basic and persistent forces, some recognizable pat-
tern in the motley succession of specific events. To quote Professor
Grebler: "Here, as in the interpretation of other events, it is neces-
sary to distinguish sharply between the incidents that give rise to
political actions arid the more deep-seated forces that underlie the
actions" (p. 56). It does not require much digging or imagination
to identify the more deep-seated and persistent forces that give
continuity to social life and impose some order on its course. The
members of society transmit their continuing heritage from one
generation to another arid, expecting to do so, plan their actions
accordingly. New social inventions, geared to the needs of the
moment, are added to a series of other past events and thus ab-
sorbed into a common stock of experience. The past so determines
the present that the choice is constrained, and the new and unu-
sual elements, the inventive aspect of history, are to some extent
kept within limits. In the particular stor/ told by Professor Grebler,
is it not clear that the whole cast of our society made some other
alternatives that might have been imagined highly unlikely. e.g.,
complete substitution of public for private financing or a drastic
reorganization of the residential construction industry under gov-
ernment control? If large-scale government aid to financing of
new housing was novel in our history, it also hadelements of the
old - in that it was aid to private financing and attempted to pre-
serve the organizational fabric of the industry andof the network
of private finance built around it. And again, after the program
was initiated tinder the impact of the specific conditionsof the
mid- 1930's, did not this series of steps prove to be cumulative, so
that in turn it became part of the heritage and will affect what
is likely to happen in the future? It is this combination: the lirnita-
tions on any new steps by the continuing past and the cumulation
9of new changes into a persisting contribution of the past that lends
historical continuity to the whole course of eonornic and social
change. To find this continhlnhls pattern is the goal of empirical
research,
Three brief comments in conclusion may he in order. First, one
of the ways to find intellectual order, that is, to distinguish persis-
tent from transient factors, is to lengthen the historical perspective.
Such extension of the perspective permits one to study a greater
variety of events and should inhibit mechanical extrapolations
from short series of events. For this reason, the prescilt inquiry
into capital formation and financing attempts to cover a relatively
long stretch of our economic past - although for several prob-
lems our stretch is not long enough.
Second. one may ask as to the proper definition of the term
"government." As it is used, the termleads one to think of a nar-
rowly defined institution, an industry -- in which meaning it is
often employed in industrial distributions of the labor force or of
national incomc. But the same term is also applied to thestate,
the society as a whole acting under a different name from that
which is used when it acts as a collection of living and consuming
units, or as a group of producers organized in business firms. The
extreme multiplicity and variety of governmental functions, and
the claims made upon the government in a free society (rather
than claims made by it, which are prominent in an authoritarian
society)clearly suggest such interpretation. In many contexts
governmental activity and policy must he viewed not as a set of
decisions by a group of bureaucrats, hut rather hsociety
whether or not under pressure of special groups. In these cases,
government activity must be studied for its functional implications
exaniincd, as Professor Grebler does, for the underlying forces,
the social and economic values which drive society, through its
government, to take certain actions under certain circumstances.
Third, it may seem that broad reflections of this kind have no
practical hearing. Now, it is true that they arc of little use in deal-
ing with detailed and specific questionssuch quandaries as
whether to use index A or index B for adjustment for price changes.
how to frame or whether to introduce regulation X or W, whether
10to count upon lower interest rates during the next year or two and
arrange investments accordingly. But these fundamental notions
have hearing upon the direction and ctandarcls of economic and
related research, and upon the effectiveness of such research in
influencing the course of economic educationin the first place
of scholars in the field and eventually of society itself. Basic social
decisions arc made within a framework and against the back-
ground of some implicit theory or theories as to how economy and
society operate; of some knowledge, no matter how crude, of the
basic magnitudes; of some hypotheses about how individuals and
groups will respond to changes to be imposed by the decisions.
Such thcory, knowledge, hypotheses are the results, in part, of
thinking and research by scholars in the field, in part, of direct
experience by individual members of society. The basic notions
that govern the directions of research and channel the thinking
are, therefore, important because they affect the framework
within which far-reaching social decisions are made. Hence one
may urge that in the long run, the run that affects ourselves and
future members of society, a set of basic notions that forces one to
consider not only the full diversity of economic experience, but also
the testable distinctions between the more lasting and the more
ephemeral factors in operation is of great practical importance.
The whole cast of the inquiry' of which the present paper is the
first instalment is colored by such notions. They cannot be stated
here in precise detail, nor is their precise formulation indispensable
for determining the specific course of our study. But their general
import is decisive to it: decisive for an understanding of the aim
of the inquiry and of what each piece contributes to that aim.
SIMON KUZNETS
Director's Comment: I do not share Dr. Kuznets' apparent faith in
"our capacity to extract from the past results both tangible and stable
enough to provide a firm basis for analyzing current problems and
future prospects." Although the present is, of course, limited by the
past, the limits would appear to be broad enough to permit an infinite
variety of future courses of action. If the term "cumulative" as used
11hy Dr. Kuznets refers to the future rather than to the past, it surely
(ajiflOt be maintained that all social innovations are cumulative. I-us-
tory affords examples of discontinuities ass'cll as continuities.
11w al)ovc observations are not intended to detract from the value
of the excellent study made by Dr. Grebler, nor from the value of the
companion studies in the present series. Although we may never be
able to j)redlct the course of future social development, we do know
from experience that social change generally takes place slowly. There
is, accordingly, a fair degree of probability that the relationships
which have obtained in the not-too-distant past will persist withslight
modification into the not-too-distant future. The assumption ofa cer-
tain measure of inertia in social institutions and in the social values
which support them is a far cry, however, from Dr. Kuznets'assump-
tion that there is "some discoverable order in the past, some basicand
pt'rsistent forces, some recognizable pattern in the motley succession
of specific events."
CLARENCE lIFER